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Baby Contracts
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
The growing use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures1 raises a host
of troubling legal issues. What should courts do with previously produced
preembryos when a couple divorces after the IVF procedure and the parties
cannot agree on the preembryos' disposition? Courts and commentators
have so far reached different conclusions.2 Litowitz v. Litowitz3 complicates
the picture even further.
In Litowitz, unlike most IVF cases, the eggs used in the procedure
belonged not to the wife, Becky Litowitz, but to a third party who donated
her eggs to the Litowitzes for use in the IVF procedure. The donated eggs
1. In vitro fertilization involves injecting a woman with fertility drugs to stimulate the
production of eggs, which can be surgically retrieved and combined with a man's sperm in a petri
dish to fertilize the eggs. If fertilization occurs, some of the preembryos are immediately
implanted into the woman's body. The rest of the preembryos are usually frozen for later
implantation if the couple desires more children, or if the first attempt at implantation fails. A.Z.
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass. 2000).
2. Not counting Litowitz, there have been only four published cases dealing with the question
of preembryo disposition. Id. (holding that forcing a party to become a parent is against the state's
public policy); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (same); Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that contracts, even in the procreation context, are presumed
valid and should be enforced when entered into voluntarily and with informed consent); Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting a balancing approach that weighs the equities on
both sides).
Legal scholars have devoted a substantial amount of attention to the problem, mostly focusing
on its moral and constitutional dimensions and analyzing the issue from a purely ex post
perspective-that is, only after disputes have arisen. See, e.g., Mark C. Haut, Note, Divorce and
the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493 (1999) (arguing for a clear default
rule favoring non-use of frozen preembryos in disputed cases); Mario J. Trespalacios, Comment,
Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803 (1992) (arguing,
based on implied-contract theory, that courts should generally favor the party who desires
implantation, because the parties' prior participation in the IVF procedure indicates an irrevocable
commitment to reproduction).
3. 10P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
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were combined with the sperm of the husband, David Litowitz, to produce
preembryos, which were then implanted into the body of a fourth party-
the surrogate mother. The procedure did not involve Becky Litowitz's
participation, although she and David would become the legal parents of
any resulting child. Standing in the middle of this complicated arrangement
was an additional fifth party-the medical clinic.
Luckily, the procedure worked, and baby Micah was born.
Unfortunately, the couple soon separated. In the marriage dissolution,
Becky wanted the court to award the remaining frozen preembryos to her
for further implantation in a surrogate. David, on the other hand, did not
want to be thrust into an unwanted parenting role and preferred that the
preembryos be awarded to him so that he could put them up for out-of-state
adoption. The Washington Court of Appeals ruled in David's favor. After
finding that there was no agreement governing the dispute, the court
adopted a balancing test and found that David's interests were weightier.
He was the only genetic progenitor, and courts are generally reluctant to
force any party to become a parent.
Focusing on David's rights as against Becky's, the court's opinion is
hard to fault. However, Litowitz presents a set of facts that warrants a closer
look. The large number of parties involved in some IVF procedures makes
potential disputes extremely hard to disentangle. In such situations, the
desirability of ex ante contracting becomes especially obvious. For
numerous reasons, however, parties are loathe to contract in the IVF
context. This Case Note analyzes the reasons for this reluctance and offers a
proposal that maximizes contracting incentives. In brief, I argue that IVF
clinics should be assessed a "court user fee" whenever judicial intervention
is needed to resolve IVF disputes, unless the particular issues have been
adequately anticipated in the contract beforehand. As a first step, I explore
the problems that arise when there is no contract.
I
As the Litowitz court acknowledged, the case was actually much more
complicated than it first appeared, because the interests of the egg donor-
who contributed genetic materials and thus had a much stronger claim than
Becky-diverged sharply from David's interests. The egg donor in Litowitz
did not want David to put the preembryos up for out-of-state adoption. "In
the event that the court fails to award the preembryos to Becky," she
declared in a motion to the court, "I insist that the court award the
preembryos to me or return the eggs to me in accordance with the
contract." 4 The court was able to avoid dealing squarely with the egg
4. Id. at 1090.
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donor's interests and how her rights ought to be balanced because she was
not a party to the lawsuit. But the question could not have been avoided if
she had asserted her rights.
Making matters worse, the contract the egg donor made with the
Litowitz couple before she donated her eggs to them was by no means clear
and did not contemplate dissolution of the Litowitzes' marriage. As the
court noted, the contract only made reference to "eggs." The eggs no longer
existed, however. The court wrote that the eggs "have been fertilized and
are now preembryos. Thus, the egg donor's request that the 'eggs' be
returned to her.., cannot be met. And nothing in the contract controls
disposition of the preembryos or requires the egg donor's consent to
disposition of the preembryos." 5 Therefore, if she had asserted her rights,
the court could not have simply interpreted the contract. No provision was
directly on point.
Unfortunately, the question may not be amenable to judicial resolution
in the typical, straightforward fashion. In previous cases, courts were often
able to resolve disputes by adopting a crisp, bright-line rule that strongly
favored the party who did not want to procreate.6 In cases like Litowitz,
however, this' bright-line approach is inapplicable. David, unlike the
husbands in other cases, was not against the use of the preembryos. Instead,
he wanted to put them up for adoption. The conflict was not one between
the right to procreate and the right not to procreate. Rather, the conflict was
more akin to a custody battle.
II
The multiparty scenario in Litowitz and the troubling questions the case
raises highlight the desirability of ex ante contracts that address various
contingencies, including divorce. Despite the well-known benefits of ex
ante contracting, however, parties consistently fail to specify what should
be done in case of separation. Even when the egg donor in Litowitz took the
trouble to contract with the couple, everyone stayed silent about the
possibility of divorce. This Part discusses several possible explanations for
this reluctance to contract.
The reasons are not hard to fathom. For substantially the same reasons
that many couples do not enter into prenuptial agreements, couples
5. Id.
6. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057-58 (holding that the court would not compel a donor to
become a parent against his or her will, since "forced procreation is not an area amenable to
judicial enforcement"); J.B., 751 A.2d at 614 (agreeing with the reasoning in the A.Z case and
holding that the court would not force a party to become a parent); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04
(finding that the interest of the party who opposes procreation outweighs the interest of the party
who prefers implantation). The Litowitz court arrived at a similar conclusion.
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contemplating the IVF procedure do not like to talk about the possibility of
separation. There may be strong norms against bringing the law to bear in
the intimate contexts of marriage and reproduction. 7 Indeed, the IVF
procedure goes one large step further than marriage in terms of the level of
emotional commitment involved by both parties. Alternatively, one can
think of the problem in terms of faulty risk estimation. Evidence has shown
that parties underestimate the risks of divorce on the eve of marriage. 8 At
least one commentator has suggested that couples going through the IVF
procedure suffer from similar cognitive distortions in their estimation of
risks.9
Aside from the fact that few people think about the risk of litigation in
the first place, the second reason for parties' failure to contract is that the
consequences of not contracting may appear minimal. Parties trust that
courts will do the "right thing" by balancing the parties' interests when
disputes arise. While some courts purport to adhere to bright-line default
rules in the absence of contracts, there are reasons to believe that courts will
not adhere strictly to defaults when doing so causes injustice. As Carol
Rose has observed, courts often fudge even seemingly clear-cut default
rules-what she calls "hard-edged rules" or "crystals"-to accommodate
notions of equity and "individualized justice," gradually turning them into
muddier doctrines that no longer yield clean, mechanical answers.
10
Therefore, even if a party dislikes the default, he still may not contract
around it.
Finally, third parties involved in the IVF procedure also have few
incentives to speak up. IVF clinics, especially for-profit clinics, do not like
to scuttle IVF transactions. They reap immediate profits with each
completed procedure, but do not bear the brunt of the costs of any
subsequent disagreements by couples. Hence, the incentives faced by
clinics-and, to some extent, egg donors-point in the direction of easing
the path to the operation. Even if contracts were written governing the
rights of the clinic and the couple, respectively, there might not be any
contract terms with respect to the rights of the husband as against those of
the wife.
7. See Cory Adams, Part Three: Getting Married: Premarital Agreements, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 121, 122 (2000) ("[M]any people find the merger of contract and marriage
unromantic, even heartless. Premarital contracts are sometimes viewed as a back-up plan just in
case, the suggestion of which may result in a cancellation of the wedding."); Lisa Bernstein,
Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 73 & n.45 (1993)
(arguing that "relational factors" have a strong influence on parties' willingness to contract around
default rules and that "marriage is an example of a contracting context where the relational costs
of varying default rules... through a prenuptial agreement may be particularly high").
8. William Sieck, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization and the Right To Procreate: The Right to
No, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 466 n.179 (1998).
9. Id.
10. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,595 (1988).
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While understandable, these barriers to contracting entail costs to
society. The externalized litigation costs are far from negligible, and most
likely offset any earlier savings in contracting costs by the parties. Perhaps
in recognition of this problem, Florida passed a law in 1997 requiring
parties to contract before they embark on the procedure,"I and other states
have considered similar legislation. 12 However, this sort of command-and-
control solution may not work very well. As several commentators have
observed, there is little assurance that these contracts will be entered into
knowledgeably. Clinics may simply go through the motions and ask clients
to sign standardized forms that turn out to be unenforceable when disputes
arise. 13 Hence, unless courts are to turn a blind eye to these problems and
enforce contracts regardless of the lack of consent, judges may still be left
without any guidance at the end of the day. Furthermore, as experience in
the administrative field shows, a top-down regulatory approach produces
inefficiencies. 14 There may be better ways to avoid protracted litigation.
III
A better idea worth pursuing is to make clinics more responsible for the
decision whether-and how-a contract should be drawn up in particular
cases. As repeat players, clinics are best situated to acquire expertise in
writing and revising contracts suitable for simple recurring transactions.
They are also the ones that can best decide from experience what sorts of
IVF arrangements are most likely to result in disputes that cannot easily be
resolved out of court and thus require more extensive contracting. For
example, clinics should be particularly alert to the potential landmines
lurking beneath a Litowitz-type arrangement that requires many parties'
cooperation. Ideally, clinics should help the parties write a detailed contract
in these situations, spelling out various contingencies and treating
contracting costs as ordinary expenses. Under the status quo, however, IVF
clinics have no incentives to do so. This Part explains how a system of
court user fees may help fix the problem.
When a dispute arises that requires judicial intervention, the court
should charge the IVF clinic responsible for the particular IVF procedure in
question a court user fee, unless the dispute is governed by a contractual
11. FLA. STAT. ch. 742.17 (2000).
12. See, e.g., A.B. 2478, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1999); S.B. 1120, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999). See
generally Jennifer Hodges, Comment, Thursday's Child: Litigation over Possession of
Cryopreserved Embryos as a Call for Legislation, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 257 (1999)
(discussing legislation and proposals relating to the disposition of frozen preembryos).
13. See, e.g., Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Preembryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897 (2000); Haut, supra note 2, at 523-24.
14. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 98 (1995).
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provision hammered out by the parties ex ante. For example, if something is
in dispute, but the contract anticipates that contingency and provides
guidance for its resolution, the clinic should be .spared the fee even if
judicial intervention is required. In these cases, the parties have clearly
overcome their usual reluctance to contract in the IVF context by having
included a provision that directly governs. Charging them a fee in this
situation, when other regular users of the court system are not assessed a
similar fee, discourages IVF compared to other activities that carry no such
penalty. Unless IVF procedures are deemed socially undesirable, chilling
the use of the technology is not a good result.
In contrast, if a dispute arises about which the contract provides no
guidance, the clinic should be assessed the fee. The amount should be
roughly equal to the increase in adjudication costs attributed to the absence
of a contractual provision governing the dispute. In the presence of
contractual provisions directly on point, courts can usually resolve
disagreements more easily. Their absence deprives courts of that benefit
and increases adjudication costs, which the parties, not society, should bear.
By making IVF clinics internalize this increase in adjudication costs, this
proposal gives clinics an incentive to require parties to make socially
efficient contracts before they start the procedure. This is because profit-
maximizing clinics will now decide whether to require a contract (and how
specific the contract should be) based on a consideration of all the relevant
costs and benefits, taking into account the probabilities of various
contingencies actually happening. For example, clinics will probably
require a couple engaged in a simple two-party transaction to complete only
a fairly simple form that stipulates how the preembryos should be disposed
of in case of separation. Even if the couple divorces and goes to court to
fight the issue, the clinic would be off the hook as long as the dispute was
anticipated in the contract. In contrast, the clinic will likely require parties
undergoing a Litowitz-type operation to write more extensive contracts,
specifying contingencies not limited to divorce-for example, the
possibility that the egg donor may change her mind.
Of course, IVF clinics can shift the court user fee, as well as any
contracting expenses, back to their clients by charging them higher fees for
the IVF procedure at the outset. But this shifting of costs back to the
customers is unobjectionable because, under competitive market conditions,
the amount of shifting in a particular case should reflect the complexity of
the couple's particular arrangement, as well as the couple's willingness to
cooperate with the clinic to reduce costs by writing clear contracts. From
a policy standpoint, the proposal here-incorporating a "due care"
component by rewarding clinics for anticipating risks and letting them walk
off scot-free when there is an adequate contract-is superior to a strict-
liability regime in which clinics are assessed a fee whenever IVF issues are
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litigated, regardless of the presence of contract. That is because this
proposal minimizes a host of potential bias problems in the perception of
divorce rates, relating to age, ethnicity, class, and religion. With strict
liability, clinics would be tempted to focus on these questions because they
would be automatically mulcted in court fees whenever a couple separates
and goes to court to resolve the issue of preembryo disposition. From the
clinics' perspective, the best policy under such a scheme might well be to
deny services to couples deemed to have a high risk of divorce.
15
In contrast, this proposal diverts attention from these troublesome
questions by placing the emphasis on writing better contracts more
efficiently, since clinics are immune as long as there is a contract provision
directly governing the controversy. A young minority couple, therefore,
might fare better under this proposal. 16 Even a prejudiced clinic would
know that, if the couple divorces, it will not be harmed financially as long
as it has an adequate contract worked out beforehand.
In addition, under this proposal, when IVF clinics do decide to require a
detailed contract, they would expend the effort to ensure that the requisite
elements of voluntariness and informed consent are present, lest the
contracts be declared void-a result that would carry stiff financial
penalties for the clinic when the dispute goes to court and the court finds
that no valid provision directly governs. This safeguard is absent with the
command-and-control policy.
Greater attentiveness to the parties, moreover, does not end with
contracting. Under the proposal, IVF clinics would have incentives to
devote an efficient amount of resources to continue to monitor the progress
of the operation in order to forestall and resolve disputes. In case of
disputes that go to court, the clinic always faces the possibility that a court
will find that a particular contingency before the court has not been
anticipated in the contract. IVF clinics thus have every incentive to prevent
problems before they occur, both by writing better contracts at the outset, as
well as by employing appropriate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
to hammer out compromises once the procedure is underway. This would
15. Another possibility would be for clinics to price discriminate against "high-risk" couples,
instead of denying service to them. It is doubtful, however, that clinics would adopt this strategy.
Because differential prices are easily quantifiable, clinics might worry that the public would come
to find out, for example, that blacks are systematically charged higher prices than whites for the
same procedures. In contrast, it is much harder to keep track of how many customers are "denied
service" and subtly turned away.
16. Part of the proposal's attractiveness is that it avoids the debate about whether black
couples in fact have higher divorce rates than whites. There is by no means a settled consensus on
the question. Compare Courtland Milloy, The Undoing of Black Marriages, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
1996, at B t (citing studies that establish that "black marriages are twice as likely to end in divorce
as white marriages"), with Karen S. Peterson, Black Couples Stay the Course Still, Pressures of
Race Are Taking Toll on Relationships, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at C3 (citing
a University of Chicago study that black and white divorce rates are actually quite similar).
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further decrease adjudication costs. No IVF clinics, however, should be
allowed under the proposal to force their will on any party by impeding
access to the courts by, say, providing for binding arbitration procedures.
This is because of the importance of the rights involved and the consequent
strong public policy reasons for judicial oversight. Allowing clinics to
block access to courts, moreover, would destroy the incentive structure by
removing the stick-court fees-that prods clinics accurately to take into
account all the costs and benefits.
Under this proposal, some clinics might well offer "rebates" to
cooperative couples. These financial incentives may lead to an even greater
willingness by parties to think about problems ex ante, gradually breaking
down the taboo against anticipating contingencies in the IVF context.
Further, courts may start adhering to default rules. Parties who refuse to
contract even in the face of strong financial incentives may have a harder
time eliciting judicial sympathy. Refusing to contract even when
contracting is rewarded may signal that the parties really have no strong
objections to the default rule, despite later protestations to the contrary. 17
IV
The facts of the Litowitz case should jolt commentators from their usual
posture of looking at the problem only from an ex post perspective. By
looking at how disputes can be prevented before they arise and by giving
clinics incentives to avoid problems, this proposal should go toward
lowering some common barriers to IVF contracting in a cost-effective way
and prevent the law in this developing area from ossifying.
-Chi Steve Kwok
17. The preceding analysis has assumed that courts would generally enforce IVF contracts
entered into voluntarily and with informed consent. There may well be weighty public policy
reasons, however, for refusing to enforce IVF arrangements in some situations. Nothing in the
proposal, however, prevents courts from refusing to enforce certain contract terms drawn up by
clinics that violate public policy. As an addendum to the above proposal, courts may impose an
added penalty on clinics if they are reckless in drawing up contracts by, for example, including
arrangements that clearly contravene the settled public policy of the state and that cannot fairly be
seen as legitimate attempts to extend the application of the law.
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